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The Growing Threat of Pandemics: Enhancing Domestic and           
International Biosecurity 
Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs  The Bush School of Government and Public Service
The threat posed by pandemics grows along-
side increased globalization and technologi-
cal innovation. Distant cultures can now be 
connected in a day’s time, and international 
trade links global health and economic pros-
perity. In this report, the Scowcroft Institute 
of International Affairs at the Bush School of 
Government and Public Service at Texas 
A&M University  details nine priority areas 
and accompanying action items that will help 
to address current pandemic response prob-
lems. 
1. Leadership: Strong leadership in biode-
fense and pandemic preparedness and re-
sponse is the first area identified as needing 
improvement. Following the recommenda-
tions made by the Blue Ribbon Panel on Bio-
defense (2015), we recommend that United 
States leadership in biodefense be centralized 
in the White House, specifically within the 
Vice President’s office. Also in line with rec-
ommendations made by the Biodefense 
Panel, we recommend that a Biodefense 
Council, overseen by the Vice President, be 
established. Additional action items include 
the establishment of a new and overarching 
National Biodefense and Pandemic Prepared-
ness Strategy. Beyond the panel’s findings, 
we recommend a detailed implementation 
plan, tied to a unified and integrated budget, 
with built-in accountability to ensure decen-
tralized action. We also call for the reprioriti-
zation of national and international pandemic 
preparedness and response exercises. 
2.  International Response: We should re-
evaluate pandemic response plans—in partic-
ular, the need to adopt the World Health Or-
ganization’s (WHO) reforms: WHO estab-
lished an advisory group in 2015 to determine 
ways to improve its response to disease out-
breaks and emergencies following an ineffec-
tive response to the Ebola outbreak in 2014. 
We endorse the recommendations for reform 
provided by the advisory group and urge pri-
ority action for reform implementation. We 
also recommend that WHO Regional Office 
directors no longer be independent from 
WHO Headquarters, but report directly to the 
Director-General. Independence of the re-
gional offices makes a unified WHO re-
sponse difficult and can impede efficient 
communication and organization during pan-
demic response.  
3. The Anti-vaccine Movement: The in-
creasing influence of the anti-vaccine move-
ment in the United States is another growing 
threat. Leaders of the movement spread mis-
information to parents with questions or anx-
iety over the safety of vaccines. Many within 
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the anti-vaccine movement incorrectly be-
lieve that vaccines cause autism, and the 
number of individuals seeking nonmedical 
exemptions to the vaccination requirements 
of schools is on the rise. In some states, like 
Washington and Texas, this puts public 
school populations dangerously close to fall-
ing below the threshold for “herd immunity,” 
which refers to the percentage of a population 
that needs to be vaccinated in order to provide 
protection to those who are unvaccinated. 
Dropping below herd immunity puts individ-
uals who cannot get vaccinated—those that 
are either too young or immunocompro-
mised—at great risk. We recommend that 
public health authorities initiate education 
campaigns to communicate the risk that vac-
cine-preventable disease poses to unvac-
cinated individuals. Additionally, we 
strongly recommend that states re-evaluate 
their acceptance of personal belief or philo-
sophical exemptions. These should be re-
moved as exemption options. 
4. Animal and Human Health: Next we ad-
dress the need to bridge the gap between ani-
mal and human health. The majority of 
emerging diseases are zoonotic. Whether due 
to living in close proximity with animals, de-
struction and encroachment of habitats, or 
lack of vaccinations, diseases originating in 
animals are increasingly making the jump 
into the human population. Some of our rec-
ommendations for bridging the gaps in this 
area include the following: expanded animal 
vaccination programs; institutionalization of 
One Health, a program that creates collabora-
tion between human and animal health care 
professionals and researchers with the goal of 
developing an interdisciplinary strategy for 
animal, human, and environmental health; in-
creased disease surveillance along wild-
life/livestock boundaries; and education and 
training for individuals who live or work in 
high-risk areas. 
5. Uniform Health Screening: There should 
be uniform health screenings for individuals 
seeking permanent or extended temporary 
residence in the United States. Immigrants 
and refugees are a vital part of American so-
ciety. The United States must continue to 
welcome them, but there are currently, dis-
crepancies between the vaccination require-
ments for immigrants and the vaccination re-
quirements for refugees, which should be 
made uniform. Immigrants are required to 
have all their vaccinations before entering the 
country, whereas refugees are only strongly 
recommended to do so. There are also limited 
health screening requirements for individuals 
who are not seeking permanent residence in 
the United States. It may not always be pos-
sible for refugees to receive their vaccina-
tions overseas, so we suggest requiring im-
munizations upon entry and requiring health 
screenings for anyone staying in the US more 
than three months. We also recommend im-
plementing more risk-based infectious dis-
ease screenings that reflect the individual’s 
country of origin. 
6. Public Health and Health Care Infra-
structure: In many developing countries, 
there are insufficient infrastructure, exper-
tise, and supplies to adequately provide for 
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even basic day-to-day health care, let alone to 
detect, report, and respond to infectious dis-
ease outbreaks and other threats as required 
by WHO's International Health Regulations 
(IHR). Even the US, which has greater exper-
tise and higher investment in healthcare, 
struggles with adequate surge capacity in the 
case of a high-impact infectious disease out-
break or other emergencies. In this section, 
we recommend investment in host country 
institutions and restructuring hiring systems 
for health care professionals in developing 
countries. In addition, enhanced diplomacy 
and commitment to the Global Health Secu-
rity Agenda will help support implementation 
of the International Health Regulations. We 
also recommend enhanced foreign aid invest-
ments in global health, specifically for pan-
demic prevention and preparedness, as they 
are essential to international security and US 
national security.  
7. Effective Outbreak Response: The US is 
often caught unprepared when an outbreak 
with pandemic potential strikes. Valuable 
time is wasted in the existing, cumbersome 
process of identifying the disease, predicting 
risk, and acquiring emergency appropriations 
to respond. To help create a more effective 
response, we recommend that Congress make 
funding for diagnostics and biosurveillance a 
high-priority budget item. In addition, the 
United States should use the USAID Office 
of Foreign Disaster Assistance’s (OFDA) fi-
nancial authorities and resources, which are 
not earmarked, as an international pandemic 
emergency response fund to reduce the need 
for supplemental emergency appropriations. 
We further recommend that the new national 
biodefense and pandemic preparedness strat-
egy affirm OFDA’s role as the lead coordina-
tor of the United States’ international re-
sponse for pandemic emergencies, similar to 
its lead role for all other international disaster 
responses. 
8. Cultural Competency: Ebola demon-
strated that disease control protocols and cul-
tural rituals can collide with devastating re-
sults. In this report, we suggest that cultural 
anthropologists and crisis communicators be 
consulted and included in US public health 
missions to other countries.  
9. Academic Collaborations: Academic in-
stitutions situated in developing countries 
have pre-established relationships with the 
affected people in their local communities 
and regions and will be around long after the 
acute response phase has ended. There are 
also growing global academic and scientific 
university-based collaborations between fac-
ulty and students in developed and underde-
veloped countries. We suggest building uni-
versity-based public health extension pro-
grams designed to work within local commu-
nities and communicate disease research to a 
nonacademic audience as well as incorporat-
ing host country universities and their estab-
lished, global academic collaborations into 
the overall disease response.  
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The world is experiencing accelerated levels 
of change. Massive expansion of global 
travel; economic interdependence; global 
supply chains; climate change; urbanization; 
deforestation; technological advancement; 
and the expansion of mechanized, scientific 
commercial food production are just a hand-
ful of the changes that have occurred globally 
in the last fifty to seventy years. Remote vil-
lages in Africa are not as disconnected from 
the US population as they once were, and 
people are coming in increasingly close con-
tact with wildlife populations around the 
world. Armed conflict is causing an unprece-
dented migration of people, and, in fact, the 
United Nations High Commission for Refu-
gees (UNHCR) reports that there are cur-
rently 65 million internally displaced people 
and refugees—the largest number in history. 
Air travel allows a person to move around the 
world in a day. All of these elements play a 
role in the increasing number of emerging 
and re-emerging infectious diseases through-
out the world. 
Preparing for and responding to diseases with 
pandemic potential is one of the greatest chal-
lenges modern society faces. These outbreaks 
cause loss of life, loss in personal and na-
tional income, and foreign policy challenges. 
The United States government’s current re-
sponse approach relies too heavily on supple-
mental emergency appropriations from Con 
 
gress and other donors for the massive fund-
ing required. This has the effect of creating a 
slower than necessary response as organiza-
tions are waiting for funds to be allocated be-
fore they take action. Once the funds are ap-
propriated, the money must then be spent 
quickly in an attempt to control the epidemic 
after it is already out of control.  
The Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS) and other supporting public 
health officials need emergency funding au-
thorities and appropriations, similar to the 
Stafford Act, which is designated for the Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) and other emergency management 
activities. We support the establishment of 
emergency funding authority but emphasize 
that establishing the emergency fund should 
not cause a reduction in funding for infec-
tious disease preparedness more broadly.  
The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa cost 
the United States government $2.4 billion in 
response operations. The United States and 
the rest of the international community spend 
billions of dollars responding to epidemics 
and pandemics that occur with greater and 
greater frequency. This reactive method of 
disease response is not sustainable and does 
little to prevent the emergence of infectious 
diseases at their source. Organizational and 
funding changes must be made at a domestic 
and international level to avoid the exponen-
tial loss of resources, personnel, economic 
Introduction 
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development, and human life caused by dis-
ease outbreaks. We cannot continue to rely on 
a reactive strategy. 
The importance of preparing for a pandemic 
cannot be overstated. At the same time, the 
importance of educated predictions and com-
munication, rather than “crying wolf” every 
time there is a possible threat, also cannot be 
overstated. Expressing certainty of a threat 
that doesn’t materialize hurts the credibility 
of the government—and more specifically, 
the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion’s (CDC) reputation—making it less 
likely that citizens will take future threats se-
riously. A prime example of this is the 1976 
swine flu outbreak, a virus said to be a direct 
descendant of the 1918 flu. A massive, na-
tionwide vaccination campaign was launched 
in preparation for the outbreak. The outbreak 
America so greatly feared never materialized 
and, instead, an increased risk of Guillain-
Barre syndrome was later linked to the 1976 
flu vaccine (CDC, 2015b). This incident re-
sulted in the firing of the CDC director and 
embarrassment for the federal government as 
well as laying the groundwork for the distrust 
of flu vaccines we see today. Despite all of 
this, the 1976 incident does not diminish the 
danger posed by infectious diseases, nor does 
it take away from the importance of preparing 
for disease outbreaks. Thoughtful, deliberate, 
near real-time surveillance and epidemiolog-
ical analysis, diagnostics, and communica-
tion are critically important in responding to 
pandemic risk. Prematurely or incorrectly an-
nouncing disease threats can cause backlash 
and a lack of trust among the public.    
Recognizing that we face the threat of pan-
demics is the first step. Taking action to cor-
rect or minimize the threat is the second. This 
white paper outlines the major obstacles 
standing in the way of optimal pandemic pre-
vention, preparedness, and response—many 
of which were discussed during the 2nd An-
nual Pandemic Policy Summit hosted by the 
Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs. 
There are nine problem topics this white pa-
per will cover. These areas are the need for 
effective, centralized leadership and collabo-
ration and better use of available resources; 
improved international system response; to 
counter the anti-vaccine movement and stress 
the threat from vaccine-preventable diseases; 
to bridge the gap between animal and human 
health; implementation of more uniform 
health screenings and travel education; im-
proved and sustained public health institu-
tions and infrastructure; to respond effec-
tively and in a timely way to disease out-
breaks; to establish cultural competency in 
pandemic response; and to establish and ex-
pand the unique role of universities. Each 
problem outlined in this paper is coupled with 
action items that will help close the gaps in 
disease preparedness and response.  
This paper aims to create a realistic and ef-
fective plan for reducing the threat of pan-
demics throughout the world. The plan also 
helps to mitigate the need for large, recurring, 
supplemental emergency appropriations to 
respond to outbreaks after they are already 
beyond control. Many of the intellectual and 
organizational structures necessary to accom-
plish pandemic prevention and preparedness 
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objectives are already in place. However, we 
must maximize available authorities, budg-
ets, and resources, and the current approach 
does not do so. The action items put forth be-
low will address major gaps in both US na-
tional security and international health secu-
rity. 
As the new administration and Congress re-
focus priorities on defense and security for 
the United States, the Scowcroft Institute 
maintains not only that enhanced global 
health foreign aid and other related invest-
ments targeted at pandemic prevention are in 
our national security interest but moreover 
that subtle efforts/investments toward pre-
vention will be much less costly than the re-
active strategy we find ourselves in today. 
Problem Topic 1: Leadership, Col-
laboration, and Accountability 
Problem Statement: 
Fragmentation and a lack of coordination, 
integration, and communication within 
multilateral international organizations and 
domestic government agencies tasked with 
pandemic preparedness and control pose a 
threat to rapid and efficient disease re-
sponse. 
Background: 
Emerging infectious diseases with pandemic 
potential can have a global effect and are 
spread more easily by the travel and trade 
structures that serve as the backbone for 
global commerce. Due to the international 
nature of pandemics, there are often many 
government authorities and nongovernment 
organizations (NGOs) involved in prepared-
ness, response, and recovery. While the con-
tribution from various areas of international 
and domestic government can be beneficial 
in terms of resources, it often complicates the 
actual response process through confused 
lines of authority, a lack of ability to effec-
tively integrate resources, and communica-
tion obstacles.  
At the international level, WHO serves as the 
main authority in public health. WHO was 
established in 1948 as an entity of the United 
Nations (UN) and includes more than 190 
member states. WHO’s mission is to provide 
leadership on health matters, guide the global 
health research agenda, provide technical 
support, monitor health trends, and develop 
ethical and evidence-based policies. Alt-
hough the organization was originally estab-
lished to tackle global infectious diseases, 
WHO has expanded its scope and today pur-
sues a comprehensive health agenda. WHO 
plays a primarily supportive role but has also 
assumed an emergency response leadership 
role to support member states and emergency 
responses involving cross-border and multi-
ple-state needs. Most member states, other 
multilateral organizations, and NGOs look to 
WHO for leadership during epidemics and 
pandemics.  
The WHO enterprise includes the headquar-
ters located in Geneva and regional offices. 
The Regional Office for Africa; the Regional 
Office for the Americas, which is also the 
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Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO); 
the Regional Office for Southeast Asia; the 
Regional Office for Europe; the Regional Of-
fice for the Eastern Mediterranean; and the 
Regional Office for the Western Pacific pro-
vide WHO presence on six of the seven con-
tinents. The role of these offices is to address 
health issues that may be specific to the re-
gion, and they are the first point of contact 
when there is a suspected infectious disease 
within their region. One of the challenges that 
WHO faces, however, is that it relies heavily 
on information and cooperation from its re-
gional offices and the member states it 
serves. WHO deploys personnel and can 
make recommendations for action, but, ulti-
mately, disease detection, reporting, and re-
sponse are the responsibility of the affected 
WHO member states.  
Several after-action reports regarding the 
Ebola 2014 incident, including WHO’s own 
report, were highly critical of WHO’s re-
sponse to the outbreak. Shortcomings and 
needed reforms have been identified that re-
quire priority attention, as the global commu-
nity needs effective WHO participation and 
leadership going forward.  
In addition to WHO, there are three other in-
ternational health organizations of conse-
quence. The first of these is the Pan-Ameri-
can Health Organization (PAHO), which op-
erates much like WHO but only extends its 
authority to North, Central, and South Amer-
ican countries. It operates independently, 
providing health leadership to almost fifty 
countries, but it also serves as a regional of-
fice for WHO. One of the most important 
roles of PAHO is to help set the health agenda 
for the Americas and to provide technical as-
sistance for health issues.  
The last two international organizations of 
consequence to pandemics are the World Or-
ganisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO). OIE was imple-
mented by an international agreement in 
1924 and is tasked with controlling animal 
disease at a global level. FAO is an entity of 
the UN with the purpose of eradicating hun-
ger and food insecurity. The role of FAO in 
pandemic preparedness and response may not 
be quite as obvious as the other organiza-
tions, but the natural and bioterrorist threat to 
agriculture presents a food security challenge 
that would likely fall under its purview. The 
majority of emerging infectious diseases with 
pandemic potential are zoonotic. The grow-
ing recognition for the need to apply One 
Health approaches—which integrate all as-
pects of animal, human, and environmental 
health care through worldwide, interdiscipli-
nary collaboration—to controlling high-im-
pact emerging infectious diseases makes 
close collaboration between WHO, OIE, and 
FAO critical. 
In the US, there are many organizations and 
government officials involved in preparing 
and responding to pandemics at federal, state, 
local, and tribal levels. At the federal level 
alone, there are at least ten departments and 
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agencies and over fifty presidentially ap-
pointed, senate-confirmed individuals that 
have biodefense responsibilities (Larsen et 
al., 2015).  
The Pandemic Influenza Implementation 
Plan identifies two departments with more 
significant leadership roles in pandemic re-
sponse: the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) is the lead for federal medi-
cal and public health response, and the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS) is the 
lead in overall domestic incident manage-
ment and federal coordination.   
As such, the Secretary of HHS is the lead for 
federal public health and medical response 
during a domestic infectious disease out-
break. The Assistant Secretary for Prepared-
ness and Response (ASPR) was created by 
the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness 
Act (PAHPA) in 2006 and serves as the Sec-
retary’s principal advisor on all matters re-
lated to public health, medical preparedness, 
and response for public health emergencies. 
Although some argue that Congress intended 
for the ASPR to lead all federal interagency 
biodefense efforts, including pandemic re-
sponse, that mandate is not authorized by leg-
islation or executive action. The ASPR did 
establish the Public Health Medical Counter-
measures Enterprise (PHEMC) to coordinate 
medical countermeasure preparedness and 
response activities across HHS, including ac-
tivities of the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS), United States Department of Ag-
riculture (USDA), Department of Defense 
(DOD), and Veterans Affairs (VA).  
Within HHS, the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention is the major operational divi-
sion for public health preparedness and re-
sponse. Its role includes conducting the ma-
jority of human infectious disease surveil-
lance, maintaining public health laboratory 
capabilities, and supporting state and local 
public health for preparedness planning and 
response activities. Several other staff and 
operating divisions in HHS also have signifi-
cant roles, including the Centers for Medicaid 
Services, the National Institutes of Health, 
the Federal Food and Drug Administration, 
the Assistant Secretary of Health, the Sur-
geon General, and others. 
The Secretary of Homeland Security serves 
as the principal federal official for domestic 
incident management and coordinates the 
overall federal response, assuring the full 
function of the nation’s critical infrastructure. 
The Secretary is also responsible for setting 
reporting requirements and communicating 
with all entities involved in the response. 
Within DHS, however, there are many organ-
izations that are involved in a pandemic re-
sponse. These include the Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency (FEMA), US 
Customs and Border Protection, the Trans-
portation Security Authority (TSA), the Of-
fice of Public Affairs, and the US Coast 
Guard. Each of these organizations plays a 
separate role in the response, including 
screening of potentially sick individuals and 
referring people to public health quarantine 
authorities. DHS also has a responsibility to 
mitigate the entry of contaminated products 
into the country by screening vessels, trucks, 
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aircraft, and other forms of commerce when 
they reach the border or port of entry.  
The United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) is responsible for inspecting all ani-
mals and plants entering the United States, 
but it is also the main agency tasked with re-
sponding to animal disease outbreaks. 
Though USDA is often overlooked when dis-
cussing issues of human health, its surveil-
lance of animal health can be an important 
tool in preventing zoonotic outbreaks. Unfor-
tunately, the links between animal and human 
surveillance are extremely limited, and wild-
life surveillance is in a different department 
altogether (Department of the Interior). There 
is also a significant funding disparity be-
tween animal and human health at a time 
when a One Health approach has become in-
creasingly important to pandemic prevention.  
The Department of Defense is another major 
stakeholder in pandemic preparedness and bi-
odefense. Pandemic preparedness is critical 
for DOD to ensure that force projection, 
which is the ability to project national power 
through military operations, is not impeded in 
the event of a severe infectious disease out-
break. DOD is also responsible for protecting 
service members and their families world-
wide. DOD has unique planning logistics, 
and command and control capabilities can be 
called upon to support humanitarian relief as 
well as global and domestic natural disaster 
response. The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa was the first time that major DOD lo-
gistical, engineering, and command/control 
capabilities were deployed outside of the 
US/internationally for an infectious disease 
outbreak.  
The military and DOD have a long history of 
distinguished accomplishments in infectious 
disease research and public health for US 
military personnel, in collaboration with our 
strategic allies. DOD has world-class re-
search centers and biocontainment laborato-
ries working on defense and the control of 
high impact infectious diseases, including the 
United States Army Medical Research Insti-
tute of Infectious Diseases and the Walter 
Reed Army Institute of Research. The latter 
includes a network of international research 
laboratories that are strategically located in 
areas of the world to enable international 
public health collaboration, disease surveil-
lance, and local response, as well as further 
regional diplomacy. 
Several other departments at the federal level 
have significant responsibilities, including 
Department of State, Department of Labor, 
Department of Education, Department of 
Transportation, Federal Aviation Admin-
istration, and Department of the Interior. The 
United States Agency for International De-
velopment has unique authorities and lead re-
sponsibilities for coordinating the United 
States’ response to international humanitar-
ian and other disasters, along with a Global 
Health Bureau that deals with infectious dis-
ease and public health programs from a de-
velopment perspective. 
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In the US, while several federal organizations 
have authorities and oversight responsibili-
ties for pandemic preparedness, state and lo-
cal authorities on the frontline are ultimately 
responsible for an infectious disease response 
in their communities. These include gover-
nors, mayors, tribal leaders, and their associ-
ated government public health and emer-
gency management officials, as well as pri-
vate sector health care providers and busi-
nesses. The National Guard also has a local 
or state level role in pandemic response if ac-
tivated by a governor. 
Further, the Blue Ribbon Panel on Biode-
fense reported that there are at least twenty-
five policy documents (legislation, national 
strategies, and executive orders) covering bi-
odefense and pandemic preparedness. We do 
not lack for policy documents, but we do suf-
fer from both competing and overlapping 
strategies, which further complicate our re-
sponse efforts. We need a new, overarching 
national strategy coupled with an implemen-
tation plan to provide focus on priority ac-
tions and accountability for all levels of gov-
ernment and to provide better guidance to 
nongovernment organizations.    
To overcome the difficulties of diffuse and 
competing interagency organization and en-
sure better utilization of available resources, 
we need strong leadership to enable effective 
decentralized execution across the biode-
fense enterprise for defense against biologi-
cal threats—whether natural, accidental, or 
intentional. The Blue Ribbon Panel on Bio-
defense discussed this recommendation ex-
tensively in the 2015 report. The need for ef-
fective leadership was more recently ad-
dressed by the President’s Council of Advi-
sors on Science and Technology. The Biode-
fense Panel recommended that leadership for 
biodefense be centralized with the Vice Pres-
ident of the United States and that a White 
House Biodefense Coordination Council to 
coordinate and integrate the work of all the 
agencies and departments working on biode-
fense and pandemic preparedness should be 
established. The Panel further recommended 
that the Vice President and a Biodefense Co-
ordination Council establish a new, overarch-
ing national biodefense strategy with clear 
metrics and then hold departments/agencies 
accountable for achieving outcomes.  Some 
argue that improved biodefense and pan-
demic preparedness may not require substan-
tial new funding but rather refocus of priori-
ties, accountability, and better use of availa-
ble resources. The Scowcroft Institute con-
curs with the Panel’s leadership recommen-
dations and the need to use available authori-
ties and resources more effectively. We ex-
tend the Panel’s recommendation for a na-
tional strategy to include a detailed imple-
mentation plan with clearly identified lead 
“…we need  s t rong  l eadersh ip  to  enab le  e f fec t ive  decentral-
ized execution across the biodefense enterprise…” 
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and supporting roles for priority action items 
tied to a unified, integrated, and comprehen-
sive budget.  
Forming a biodefense council under the pur-
view of the Vice President will help to clarify 
who the response authority is at the domestic 
level. The same must be done with regard to 
the United States government response to in-
ternational disease outbreaks. The interna-
tional arena can be even more complicated to 
navigate, making it more necessary to have 
clear and established lines of authority prior 
to a pandemic response. The new national bi-
odefense strategy and implementation plan 
should affirm USAID’s Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) as the lead in 
coordinating the United States’ response to 
pandemics overseas, just as it is the lead for 
United States government response to all 
other international disasters.  
While the OFDA office already responds to 
an average of sixty-five disasters per year, the 
2014 Ebola outbreak was the first time that 
USAID/OFDA Disaster Assistance Re-
sponse Teams (DART) were deployed in re-
sponse to a pandemic (OFDA, 2017).. OFDA 
has the demonstrated experience, personnel, 
and expertise to effectively lead future inter-
national pandemic response efforts. In FY 
2015, USAID/OFDA provided over $1.6 bil-
lion for disaster response activities, in addi-
tion to almost $90 million in community dis-
aster preparation and mitigation (USAID, 
2016). In coming years, Congress and the 
White House should continue to provide 
funding for OFDA’s international response 
activities in a manner that allows the agency 
to expand response into the realm of pandem-
ics.  With existing legislative authorities, 
staffing, and a discretionary emergency re-
sponse budget, USAID/OFDA is the best 
equipped agency to lead and coordinate fed-
eral response efforts to global pandemics. 
Making sure that international pandemic re-
sponse is rapid and effective will require 
more than just putting USAID/OFDA in 
charge, however. In addition to officially des-
ignating OFDA as the lead organization in re-
sponse, clear lines of authority must be estab-
lished between USAID/OFDA, DOD, HHS, 
the State Department, and any other federal 
organizations that may be called upon. Sup-
porting agencies must know and understand 
their roles and responsibilities. We suggest 
the development of an International Re-
sponse Framework, analogous to the Na-
tional Response Framework for domestic re-
sponse, that outlines each organization’s role 
in the response and clarifies lead and support-
ing responsibilities.  
Although centralized leadership in the United 
States is vital to developing effective pan-
demic response, it is also important that col-
laboration with the international community 
be strengthened. Pandemic response requires 
a unified effort by members of the interna-
tional community, including a reformed 
WHO, the United States, other donor and re-
cipient members, and affected country gov-
ernments. If these entities are not able to 
work together and communicate to the public 
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with a unified, coherent message, the pan-
demic response will be undermined. Having 
centralized US leadership may make it easier 
to strengthen and clarify interactions with a 
reformed WHO, but this will need to be sup-
plemented by culturally appropriate commu-
nication and training regarding countries 
likely to be affected by a pandemic in order 
to increase response effectiveness.  
Beyond government organizations, there are 
still barriers to effective collaboration and di-
visions among institutions and individuals. 
Researchers are working in a range of disci-
plines, including infectious diseases, biology, 
chemistry, psychology, communication, po-
litical science, and anthropology. As pan-
demics are interdisciplinary, these research-
ers should reach out to each other to address 
the problem of pandemics more holistically. 
Researchers whose work is applicable to ele-
ments that impact disease response must col-
laborate in order for the United States to de-
vise the best possible disease prevention, 
containment, and response policies and plans. 
Unfortunately, these academic institutions 
and research institutes often have “silos”—or 
barriers to effective multidisciplinary collab-
oration. New models of collaboration, such 
as a One Health approach, can overcome 
these barriers and effectively bridge gaps 
across traditional organizational boundaries 
in both government and nongovernment or-
ganizations. Universities also have growing 
international faculty and student collabora-
tions that are an underutilized resource for 
pandemic preparedness and response and that 
could prove particularly useful at linking sci-
ence, policy, local communities, and affected 
individuals.    
Recommendations and Action Items: 
There are many US government departments 
and agencies involved in pandemic planning 
and response, and the bureaucracies associ-
ated with these departments and agencies re-
sist ceding power or territory. The threat of 
future pandemics and our vulnerabilities re-
quire strong leadership paired with the ability 
to better coordinate and integrate capabilities 
across all levels of government (federal, 
state, local, and tribal) and the private sector 
with a sense of urgency, priority, and maxi-
mization of available resources. Nationally, 
aside from the President and Vice President, 
the private sector and academia have the 
greatest ability to galvanize state, local, and 
tribal authorities. The following action items 
underscore the Blue Ribbon Panel’s first 
three recommendations. 
1. Establish strong, centralized leader-
ship at the highest level of the federal gov-
ernment. Biodefense and pandemic prepar-
edness leadership must have the ability to 
transcend internal bureaucratic strife; allow 
new evidence-based approaches to have a fair 
debate; make difficult decisions; and, im-
portantly, develop an integrated biodefense 
budget tied to a new national strategy. Lead-
ership needs to be at a level in the White 
House that can influence and galvanize ac-
tion by state, local, and tribal governments, as 
well as nongovernment organizations. The 
ultimate goal of strong centralized leadership 
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is to enable effective and focused decentral-
ized implementation with better utilization of 
available resources and existing authorities. 
2. Establish a biodefense policy coordi-
nation committee that focuses on prepared-
ness and is not diluted by day-to-day exigen-
cies. The policy process must include the 
ability for state, local, and tribal govern-
ments, as well as nongovernment organiza-
tions to provide input into the deliberative 
and planning processes.     
3. Establish a new and overarching 
National Pandemic Preparedness Strategy, 
followed by a detailed implementation plan 
that identifies lead and supporting roles and 
organizations and that is tied to a national, 
integrated pandemic preparedness budget, 
as a detailed line item in the President’s 
budget request. The implementation plan 
should include milestones and metrics and 
should hold departments and agencies ac-
countable for action. The 2017 National De-
fense Authorizing Act requires DOD, HHS, 
DHS, and USDA to establish a new national 
biodefense strategy. The Scowcroft Institute 
applauds Congress for enacting this require-
ment, and recommends that Congress exer-
cise stringent oversight responsibilities to en-
sure a sound strategy, including metrics for 
accountability, is established, implemented, 
and monitored.  
4. Prioritize national and interna-
tional-level pandemic preparedness and re-
sponse exercises and “breath life” into 
plans and exercises. Pandemic preparedness 
exercises/simulations are key to ensuring the 
best response because they give individuals 
and organizations an opportunity to work to-
gether in an outbreak scenario and help solid-
ify/secure/develop/chains of command/au-
thority and lines of communication before a 
real outbreak occurs. Simulations also allow 
officials to see what parts of the preparedness 
and response plans are working well and 
what areas need revision. It is important to 
make the exercises as real-life as possible by 
creating short deadlines, uncertainty, and the 
need to coordinate multiple agencies in a 
high-stress environment. This will provide 
individuals participating in the exercise the 
greatest learning experience.  
5. Affirm USAID/OFDA as the lead US 
government international pandemic re-
sponse. OFDA already has the pre-existing 
expertise, unique legal and acquisition au-
thority, logistic capabilities, and staff to suc-
ceed in this role. The United States govern-
ment’s international pandemic response 
needs a system in which White House leader-
ship can instill discipline in the response ef-
fort and that works effectively with members 
of the international community throughout 
the response. OFDA is the most readily 
equipped to fill this role.  
6. The United States should support 
WHO reforms that enable its effective lead-
ership in a new era of global health financ-
ing at a time when WHO faces significant 
criticism as a result of the delayed interna-
tional response to Ebola. This will require 
sustained, if not enhanced, US government 
global engagement for effective pandemic 
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preparedness planning and will help over-
come any challenges that jeopardize timely 
WHO reform. WHO’s structural, financial, 
management, and other organizational chal-
lenges require major reform and priority ac-
tion. The Director-General has stated her 
commitment to implementing recommended 
reforms to improve emergency response, but 
implementation requires support by the entire 
WHO enterprise, including the United States. 
As an action item under leadership, new 
White House and HHS leadership should 
start working with WHO and other strategic 
international partners immediately to develop 
better action plans for pandemic response and 
to identify how best to help WHO overcome 
challenges to reform. This should include 
communication guidelines to avoid contra-
dictory messages from the two organizations.  
Problem Topic 2: Restructuring the 
International System Response 
Problem Statement: 
The current international response system 
for pandemics is dysfunctional and needs 
reform. 
Background:  
Following the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa, WHO faced significant criticism for 
its management of the response, character-
ized as slow, disorganized, and inadequate. 
Member states further criticized WHO for 
being politicized and biased. Largely due to 
the backlash after Ebola, Director-General 
Margaret Chan called for reform and estab-
lished the Advisory Group on Reform to An-
alyze WHO’s Work in Outbreaks and Emer-
gencies with Health and Humanitarian Con-
sequences. This advisory group began work 
shortly after it was established in summer 
2015. 
To date, the advisory group has issued two 
reports, the first released on November 16, 
2015, and the second issued on January 18, 
2016. Both reports recommend that WHO de-
velop a unified platform that draws on all or-
ganizational resources to fight disease out-
breaks. The report termed this platform the 
Programme for Outbreaks and Emergencies 
and suggested the program be led by an Ex-
ecutive Director, who would report directly 
to the Director-General. Further, the platform 
should have “one budget, one workforce (re-
porting to the Executive Director); one line of 
managerial authority; consistent procedures 
for supporting operations across the organi-
zation; specifically designed processes for 
managing human resources, finances, pro-
curement, and logistics; and one set of perfor-
mance benchmarks to be applied across the 
organization” (Second Report of the Advi-
sory Group on Reform of WHO’s Work in 
Outbreak and Emergencies, 2016). The pro-
gram is designed to correct WHO’s frag-
mented and slow response to Ebola.  
The creation of the outbreak and emergencies 
program was just the first major step toward 
WHO reform. The advisory group also sug-
gested that WHO work with local, national, 
and regional governments throughout their 
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member states to create more resilient health 
systems prior to a disease outbreak. Despite a 
lack of extensive information about how this 
would be accomplished, there was mention of 
training local health care workers to function 
as first responders during an outbreak. We 
also suggest that building up diagnostic capa-
bilities and developing laboratory availability 
are vital to effectively creating a resilient 
health system and member states’ Interna-
tional Health Regulation compliance. 
The advisory group report proposes an alter-
native method for establishing an emergency 
health care workforce that relies much more 
heavily on involvement from a variety of sec-
tors. This recommendation from the report 
coincides with building resilience, as the ad-
visory group believes that training the local 
workforce to respond to pandemics will pro-
vide an  emergency health care workforce 
that is less dependent on a surge response 
from WHO and other member states. While 
this recommendation is valuable and training 
the local health workforce to serve as part of 
the emergency response is a good way to ex-
pand the emergency response team, it is also 
important to have scale-up capacity within 
the actual WHO response workforce. This is 
not something that is included in WHO’s re-
form recommendations. 
The advisory group also recommended that 
WHO maximize its existing funding mecha-
nisms—they provide the Central Emergency 
Response Fund, for example—and develop a 
contingency fund. The advisory group set the 
capitalization goal for this contingency fund 
at $100 million, but, as of February 2017, the 
fund had only $32.65 million available 
(WHO, 2017). In order for this contingency 
fund to be effective, it needs to attract greater 
levels of funding that can make it effec-
tive/useful in combatting future diseases. 
Member states and the global community 
cannot ask WHO to do more without com-
mensurate member state commitments to per-
form essential emergency outbreak response 
functions. 
Lastly, the advisory group on WHO reform 
identified the need to accelerate research and 
development with regard to disease outbreaks 
and emergencies. They mention the im-
portance of extending partnerships and look-
ing at different categories of donors, includ-
ing the private sector. By extending partner-
ships, particularly in the private sector, the 
advisory board states that WHO will be able 
to make real progress in increasing its ability 
to respond appropriately and innovatively to 
disease outbreaks. It should be noted, how-
ever, that there is a great deal of bureaucratic 
inertia against the reforms across the WHO 
“As  i t  cu r ren t ly  opera tes ,  WHO is  no t  e f fec t ive  a t  meet -
ing  the  needs  o f  a l l  me mber  coun t r ies  wi th  regard  to  
panemic  p repa redness  and  emergency response .”   
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enterprise, including from some member 
states. Despite the potential benefits of these 
changes, the desire to continue business as 
usual may be more powerful. The Scowcroft 
Institute stresses that this challenge to WHO 
reform must be overcome. As it currently op-
erates, WHO is not effective at meeting the 
needs of all member countries with regard to 
pandemic preparedness and emergency re-
sponse. Without implementation of these re-
forms, enhanced financing with demon-
strated better use of available resources, and 
the support of all member states, inadequate 
responses will continue, generating frustra-
tion among the global community. This could 
lead to the emergence of alternative struc-
tures that would further fracture an already 
shaky global health leadership landscape.   
Recommendations and Action Items: 
1. WHO must implement the advisory 
group’s reform recommendations. Without 
implementation of these reforms, WHO is not 
able to meet the needs of its member states 
during outbreaks and emergencies. The 2014 
Ebola outbreak in West Africa demonstrated 
exactly how badly these reforms are needed. 
By most accounts, WHO responded too late 
and in a fashion that provided little assistance 
to countries in need during Ebola. These fail-
ures must be corrected before the next major 
pandemic. If WHO is unable to implement 
timely reforms, the United States, in coordi-
nation with strategic international partners, 
should explore alternative pandemic emer-
gency response models under the United Na-
tions, such as through the United Nations Of-
fice of Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs. If 
this shift becomes necessary, it should in-
clude the reallocation of a portion of US fi-
nancial contributions normally directed to 
WHO. This reallocation should instead be 
sent to a new United Nations structure for 
pandemic emergency response. 
 
2. Regional offices should not be inde-
pendent and, instead, should report directly 
to the Director-General. While the advisory 
group makes an attempt to streamline the 
work and communication between WHO 
headquarters and its regional offices, the 
group still allows the regional offices to op-
erate independently. If regional offices are al-
lowed to maintain independence from head-
quarters, challenges with communication and 
response organization will continue. Instead, 
regional offices should operate as part of the 
hierarchy of the main organization. Requir-
ing regional directors to report to and imple-
ment decisions from the Director-General 
will help WHO have a more cohesive re-
sponse during disease outbreaks and emer-
gencies. If the regional offices must report to 
WHO headquarters, there will be less delay 
in response, as funding and physical support 
typically must come from outside the re-
gional offices. This structure would allow 
WHO headquarters to establish more strin-
gent reporting requirements for regional of-
fices in the hope of eliminating reporting and 
response delays.   
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Problem Topic 3: The Anti-vaccine 
Movement and the Re-emergence of 
Vaccine-Preventable Diseases 
Problem Statement: 
Anti-vaccination activists contribute to the 
re-emergence of vaccine-preventable dis-
eases, which has become a serious public 
health problem in the United States and 
elsewhere. The anti-vaccine movement has 
the potential to impact biodefense and pan-
demic vaccine availability, which could 
make life-saving vaccines unavailable as a 
component of a future comprehensive pub-
lic health response.  
Background:  
Vaccines are one of the greatest public health 
advances of the 20th century. During the early 
1900s in the United States, childhood mortal-
ity was staggering, rivaling what we recog-
nize today as third world suffering. Infectious 
diseases, many of which are now preventable 
through vaccines, were at the top of the list of 
childhood killers. The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention  estimated that the 
lives of 732,000 American children will be 
saved, and 322 million cases of childhood ill-
nesses will be prevented due to vaccinations 
children received between 1994, at the start 
of the Vaccines for Children Program, and 
2013 (CDC, 2014). WHO similarly reports 
that vaccines prevent an estimated 2 to 3 mil-
lion child deaths (WHO, 2016e). Smallpox, 
feared for centuries, was declared eradicated 
by the WHO in 1980 through an aggressive 
global immunization campaign. Polio, also 
feared for causing paralysis and death, has 
been eliminated in the United States and most 
of the world, with less than 100 cases re-
ported globally in 2015—also a result of a 
global immunization campaign. Similarly, 
measles, mumps, rubella, pertussis, and other 
diseases were once associated with signifi-
cant morbidity and mortality until immuniza-
tions decreased disease incidence by over 99 
percent in the United States. Unfortunately, 
many of these diseases have not been elimi-
nated globally and still threaten parts of the 
developing world, where vaccine access is 
not prevalent. In addition to the international 
impact, the US can be directly impacted 
when citizens travel abroad and infect their 
local communities upon their return.  
Because vaccines and immunization cam-
paigns have been so successful, parents today 
have not witnessed firsthand the epidemics 
these illness can become. They do not appre-
ciate the serious and potentially catastrophic 
consequences vaccine-preventable diseases 
could have on their children, families, and 
communities if allowed to return unchecked. 
Similarly, many front-line health care provid-
ers would not recognize or even consider 
these diseases in their initial differential diag-
nosis due to their low frequency of occur-
rence and their own unfamiliarity with these 
diseases that were once so common.   
The adoption of widespread, population-
based, mandatory immunization using safe 
and effective vaccines is largely responsible 
for this successful eradication. Mandatory 
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vaccination laws were first enacted in the 
early 19th century to combat smallpox in 
Massachusetts. In 1905, the United States Su-
preme Court upheld the authority of states 
and municipalities to pass compulsory vac-
cination laws that gave state and local public 
health authorities prerogative over individual 
choice to protect the public’s health and 
safety in the event of communicable diseases 
(Swendiman, 2011). Mandatory municipal 
and state-based vaccination policies have 
subsequently been adopted by all states.  To-
day, modern childhood vaccination laws pre-
scribe specific vaccine requirements for entry 
into schools, preschools, and child care facil-
ities.    
As with any vaccine or drug, there is always 
the possibility of adverse reactions as well as 
medical contraindications for some individu-
als. Because of this, every state allows vac-
cination exemptions, with exemption allow-
ances varying by state. All states allow med-
ical exemptions in the event a vaccine is con-
traindicated for a child that is immunocom-
promised, allergic to a vaccine or its excipi-
ents, or has other medical contraindications 
to receiving a vaccine. All but three states 
also allow for nonmedical exemptions, 
though the types and enforcement of these 
nonmedical exemptions varies by state. Rea-
sons for/types of nonmedical exemptions in-
clude religious, philosophical, and personal 
beliefs. For example, some religions like Je-
hovah’s Witnesses may avoid some modern 
medical practices and science. The number of 
children not receiving vaccines due to non-
medical personal belief exemptions is on the 
rise. In fact, the frequency of parents devel-
oping a personal belief that vaccines are not 
safe has put some communities at a height-
ened risk of community-level outbreaks.   
The last ten to twenty years have seen a re-
emergence of vaccine-preventable diseases 
that coincides with the rise of nonmedical ex-
emptions. Most recently, this has caused 
high-profile, multistate outbreaks of measles, 
pertussis, and mumps.  
What is causing this re-emergence of vac-
cine-preventable diseases, and why is this a 
relatively new phenomenon? A review of 
multiple studies exploring these phenomena 
in detail points to decreasing vaccine uptake 
in communities as a major factor, but not the 
only factor, tied to the re-emergence of vac-
cine-preventable diseases (Phadke, Bednar-
czk, Salmon, et al., 2011). For example, de-
creased immunizations are largely responsi-
ble for increased measles outbreaks. Pertussis 
outbreaks are also associated with decreased 
vaccination rates. But waning immunity is 
also a factor, as some don’t realize that the 
effectiveness of the vaccine decreases over 
time. Nonetheless, a clear pattern has 
emerged where parents, often from affluent 
communities, are electing to seek nonmedical 
exemptions to avoid immunizations for their 
children.  
Seemingly well intentioned but misguided 
parents avoid vaccines because of their con-
cerns about vaccine safety. Through nonex-
pert or falsified information, they are led to 
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believe there is a causal link between vac-
cines and autism. Well-organized, anti-vac-
cine activists are igniting this fear through 
misinformation that is contrary to prevailing 
scientific evidence, which shows no link be-
tween vaccines and autism.     
Societal avoidance and resistance to vaccines 
is not a new phenomenon. Vaccine resistance 
dates back to soon after Edward Jenner dis-
covered that inoculation of cowpox pustules 
induces protective immunity to smallpox. 
Since the discovery of vaccines by Jenner, re-
sistance movements have come and gone and 
have, at times, become very emotional, lead-
ing to irrational fears.  
Today, vaccine research, development, man-
ufacturing, use, and post-marketing surveil-
lance are highly regulated by the FDA. Child-
hood vaccines have advanced tremendously 
over the last fifty years and are as safe and 
effective as ever.  
The contemporary anti-vaccine resistance 
movement is, in some respects, similar to re-
sistant movements that preceded it. Unlike 
previous movements, however, current ef-
forts are based on fraudulent data accompa-
nied by intensive misinformation campaigns. 
The use of personal belief and philosophical 
exemptions is reaching a crisis point and has 
serious implications for modern society and 
health security.   
The contemporary anti-vaccine movement 
stems from a widely debunked study pub-
lished by a British physician/scientist in the 
journal The Lancet nineteen years ago 
(Wakefield, 1998). In that study, the author 
reported that twelve children who received 
the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) 
vaccine developed what, appeared to be au-
tism—implying a causal link. The claims 
made in the article ignited fear in society at 
large about the safety of vaccinations. This 
fear led to decreased vaccination rates, fol-
lowed by measles, mumps, and rubella out-
breaks in Europe and the United States.    
Subsequent investigations into the original 
1998 study revealed that the author had a sig-
nificant financial conflict of interest and had 
committed other ethical and scientific 
breaches while conducting the research. The 
editorial board of The Lancet retracted the 
publication twelve years later in 2010, and 
the UK body for medical examiners revoked 
the author’s medical license that same year. 
In 2011, The British Medical Journal pub-
lished an editorial about the investigation into 
the 1998 Lancet paper in which they con-
cluded the research was an elaborate fraud. 
Unfortunately, the damage to public health, 
families, children, and communities had al-
ready been done, and the perception of a link 
between MMR vaccines and autism persists.  
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Subsequent pivotal epidemiological studies 
have concluded there are no links between 
the active or inactive substances in vaccines 
and autism (CDC, 2015c; Taylor, 
Swerdfeger, Eslick, 2014; Jain, Marshal, 
Buikema, Bancroft, Kelly, and Newschaffer, 
2015). Although recent progress has been 
made in research to better understand the 
cause or causes of autism, there are many un-
answered questions. Childhood immuniza-
tion, however, is not one of the causes. The 
unanswered questions regarding the cause of 
autism continues to breed fear of the un-
known. It is understandable that parents may 
be vulnerable to misinformation campaigns. 
Unfortunately, these same parents are also 
unaware of the threat of measles, mumps, ru-
bella, and other infectious diseases, as mod-
ern society has lost appreciation of the dan-
gers of infectious diseases that are now 
largely prevented by vaccines.   
Anti-vaccine activists exploit the fear and un-
certainty surrounding autism, and they play 
on deeply ingrained emotions regarding per-
sonal sovereignty that conflates compulsory 
vaccination for public health as a violation of 
personal choice. Anti-vaccine advocates 
challenge sound public health recommenda-
tions, arguing that government is superseding 
individual choice. They also argue that the 
government is hiding the connections be-
tween vaccines and autism to protect pharma-
ceutical companies. This distrust of govern-
ment has created another very difficult obsta-
cle for scientists to overcome. Science is of-
ten dismissed by the anti-vaccine movement 
as a cover-up. The work of anti-vaccine ac-
tivists is succeeding with devastating results.  
This puts children who are unvaccinated by 
parental choice and those that are too young 
or ill to be vaccinated at risk of serious illness 
or death. The choice of parents not to vac-
cinate their child not only impacts their indi-
vidual child but also is a threat to the greater 
public health of the community. 
At a national level, vaccination rates are still 
high, but there are communities across the 
country where vaccination rates are below 
the level thought to be required for “herd im-
munity.” This means that those within the 
communities with true medical exemptions 
and infants too young to be vaccinated are at 
heightened risk of contracting a potentially 
fatal vaccine-preventable disease.  
Despite the hard work of public health and 
medical professionals, the scientific-based 
defense of vaccines is having minimal effect 
in slowing the growth of the anti-vaccine 
movement.  In fact, the movement is gaining 
momentum, particularly in the state of Texas, 
where personal belief exemptions have sky-
“The  work  o f  an t i -vacc ine  ac t iv i s t s  i s  succeed ing  wi th  
devas ta t ing  resu l t s .”  
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rocketed to the tens of thousands.  
As serious as the threat from the anti-vaccine 
movement is to families and communities, its 
impact could also extend to national security 
and public health preparedness for biode-
fense and pandemics. A comprehensive and 
rapid public health response is vital to detect, 
prevent, and respond to a bioterror attack or 
the emergence/re-emergence of infectious 
diseases with pandemic potential. 
The deployment and use of vaccines is an im-
portant component of a comprehensive pub-
lic health response, and vaccine preparedness 
remains a health security priority. If segments 
of the population are unwilling to receive 
vaccinations in emergency situations, it will 
be impossible to contain a bioattack or 
emerging disease. It is difficult to predict the 
exact impact the anti-vaccine movement may 
have on pandemic response, but it is possible 
that activists could impact political will to an 
extent that support for pandemic and biode-
fense vaccine initiatives could lose public 
support and necessary funding. If this occurs, 
the future of pandemic and biodefense pre-
paredness is in jeopardy.       
Recommendations and Action Items: 
1. Public health authorities and com-
munity leaders must educate communities 
and families on the dangers of vaccine-pre-
ventable diseases since the public is no 
longer aware of the threat. Parents have 
been bombarded by conflicting and, in some 
cases, fraudulent information regarding vac-
cine safety and potential links between vac-
cines and autism despite overwhelming sci-
entific evidence that contradicts those claims. 
Furthermore, most parents have never expe-
rienced the suffering and death that can result 
from vaccine-preventable diseases, such as 
measles, mumps, rubella, and pertussis.  
Anti-vaccine activists exploit parental fears 
and lack of experience with infectious dis-
ease dangers with great success.  
 
Public health authorities and other trusted 
community leaders at state, local, and tribal 
levels must confront anti-vaccine activists 
and educate the public about the threat of the 
diseases these vaccines are designed to pre-
vent. 
 
2. State legislatures and governors 
must consider legislative revisions to require 
stricter criteria for granting personal belief 
exemptions and/or consider eliminating 
personal belief exemptions entirely. Per-
sonal belief exemptions vary by state and, un-
fortunately, nonmedical exemptions have 
grown with dangerous consequences. Ac-
companying the decrease in vaccination rates 
is an increase in vaccine-preventable disease 
outbreaks. Some states, particularly those 
that have direct experience with these out-
breaks, are considering changes to nonmedi-
cal exemptions. As an example, California 
eliminated personal belief and religious vac-
cine exemptions following the 2014 multi-
state measles outbreak that could be traced 
back to exposures at Disneyland. The law 
eliminating these exemptions—California 
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Senate Bill 277—went into effect at the be-
ginning of the 2016/2017 school year (Seipel, 
2015).  
 
Establishing compulsory vaccine require-
ments is a state responsibility. All state legis-
latures and governors should review their ex-
isting laws and policies and make revisions to 
reduce or eliminate nonmedical exemptions. 
Although vaccination laws fall under state 
authority, the President should encourage all 
governors to take this action.  
 
3.  The administration and Congress 
should continue to support research to en-
sure that vaccines remain safe and effective 
and accelerate basic research to unravel the 
true causes of autism.  
The public needs to be assured that day-to-
day use of childhood vaccines remain safe 
and effective. The government should take all 
necessary actions to provide confidence to 
parents that they are making wise decisions 
to immunize their children and should con-
tinue to aggressively pursue scientific under-
standing for the true causes of autism and re-
lated ailments.   
 
 
Problem Topic 4: Addressing the 
Link between Animal and Human 
Health 
Problem Statement: 
The majority of emerging infectious dis-
eases are zoonotic and circulate in animal 
reservoirs before they cross over to infect 
humans. 
Background: 
Approximately 75 percent of human emerg-
ing infectious diseases are zoonotic—natu-
rally transmitted between animals and peo-
ple—and enter the human population through 
human contact with animals (Wolfe et al., 
2005). Some well-known zoonotic viruses in-
clude Ebola, severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS), Nipah, influenza, HIV, and 
rabies. This brief list shows that zoonotic in-
fectious diseases are some of the most threat-
ening diseases society faces, and their num-
ber and frequency will only continue to grow.  
One prominent example of a zoonotic disease 
outbreak is the 1918 influenza pandemic. 
This outbreak killed an estimated 50 to 90 
million people worldwide.  
The 2003 SARS outbreak demonstrated that 
a zoonotic disease does not have to have high 
mortality to cause significant damage. SARS 
“ S AR S  d e mo ns t r a t e s  th a t  eve n  w i tho u t  hug e  lo s s  o f  
l i f e ,  z oon o t i c  d i se a s es  c an  ha v e  d e va s t a t ing  e f f e c t s . ”  
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had a relatively low transmission and mortal-
ity rate, but it had a large economic impact on 
the countries involved. For example, SARS 
resulted in a 1.05 percent loss in GDP for 
mainland China; a 2.63 percent loss in GDP 
for Hong Kong (Lee & McKibbin, 2004); and 
an estimated $1 billion loss in Toronto due to 
decreased tourism, air traffic, and retail sales 
(CBC News, 2003). It is estimated that the 
global economic loss due to SARS in 2003 
was approximately $40 billion (Lee & 
McKibbin, 2004). SARS demonstrates that 
even without huge loss of life, zoonotic dis-
eases can have devastating effects. 
There are a number of reasons for the in-
crease in zoonotic disease prevalence. One of 
the biggest reasons is the change in human 
population density and lifestyle. This driver 
of emerging zoonotic disease is a multifold 
problem. Humans and animals are coming 
into contact more frequently and sometimes 
for the first time due to increased deforesta-
tion and urbanization. Loss of habitat forces 
wildlife to move outside their comfort zones 
to find food. Additionally, when deforested 
land is used for agriculture, farm animals 
come in close contact with wildlife. Contact 
between domestic animals and wildlife can 
lead to infections in domestic animals that are 
then transmitted to humans. This is exactly 
how Nipah virus first entered the human pop-
ulation. The virus is traditionally carried by 
fruit bats but human encroachment into fruit 
bat territory in Malaysia brought infected 
fruit bats and pigs into contact in 1998 (Chua 
et al., 1999; Paton et al., 1999; WHO, 2016b). 
The pigs then transmitted the disease to hu-
mans, and this outbreak resulted in the iden-
tification of the Nipah virus (WHO, 2016b).  
Working hand-in-hand with deforestation, 
the building of logging roads provides access 
to previously inaccessible areas of the forest. 
Bush meat hunters are able to utilize these 
roads and come into contact with a wider va-
riety of wildlife (Wolfe et al., 2005). This al-
lows for diseases that may have existed in a 
wildlife population for decades to be trans-
mitted and emerge within the human popula-
tion. Once a disease makes contact with hu-
mans, it is able to begin changes to be more 
suitable for human-to-human transmission. 
Although wildlife does serve as the main 
source for many emerging zoonotic diseases, 
domestic animals also play a role. Domestic 
swine often serve as a “mixing vessel” for in-
fluenza viruses, and they can serve as an in-
termediary, as they did for the Nipah virus. In 
developing countries, the dog population is 
the main source of rabies infection. Cats in 
the developed world are the main source for 
toxoplasmosis. Diseases from domestic ani-
mals can also have an impact on food safety. 
Some of the most common food-borne dis-
eases throughout the world are caused by 
E.coli, Salmonella, and Listeria. These dis-
eases are able to infect humans through un-
washed meat, meat that has not been properly 
cooked, or unpasteurized dairy products and 
juices.  
Population growth, translocation, and human 
behavior is changing the world, and many of 
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these actions are bringing wildlife in closer 
contact with human populations. There does 
not appear to be an end in sight for many of 
these ecological changes, meaning we will 
continue to see new, emerging, and re-emerg-
ing zoonotic infectious diseases spilling over 
into the human population. 
There have been attempts to tackle the chal-
lenges posed by zoonotic diseases, but most 
programs and funding are distinct for either 
human health or animal health. The CDC re-
cently established the National Center for 
Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases 
(NCEZID), however, which addresses the 
human-animal health link. Nonetheless, ef-
fective linkages between animal and human 
health remain elusive.  
An approach that is gaining attention for ad-
dressing the animal, human, and environmen-
tal nexus is One Health, which seeks to bring 
together multidisciplinary expertise in animal 
and human health and the associated environ-
mental ecosystems. The goal of One Health 
in this context is to fully address biological 
threats—whether natural or man-made— in a 
transdisciplinary manner by integrating re-
search, knowledge, and other defense mech-
anisms, including all aspects that can impact 
human health. In order for this program to be-
come effective, a One Health approach needs 
to be institutionalized and recognized at the 
federal level across departments/agencies, 
particularly HHS, USDA, USAID, DHS, De-
partment of Interior, and even DOD. Today, 
USAID is ahead of other agencies, applying 
One Health approaches through its emer-
gency pandemic threats program in the Bu-
reau of Global Health.       
Similarly, One Health needs to be applied lo-
cally by NGOs and universities toward the 
prevention of zoonotic infectious diseases at 
their source.  
Recommendations and Action Items: 
1. There should be an expansion of 
vaccination programs for livestock, domes-
tic animals, and wildlife. Some countries al-
ready have extensive animal vaccination pro-
grams, but other countries do not. Lack of 
vaccination can lead to deaths by vaccine-
preventable diseases. Bangladesh is an excel-
lent example of the positive impact expanded 
vaccination programs can have. In 2010, the 
country began a campaign to eliminate rabies 
by conducting mass dog vaccinations and in-
creasing the availability of free vaccines. In 
the three years following the initiation of the 
program, the number of human rabies deaths 
decreased by 50 percent (WHO, 2016d). As 
this example demonstrates, vaccination pro-
grams for animals can have the indirect effect 
of protecting the human population.   
 
2. Increased disease surveillance at the 
animal-human and wildlife-domestic ani-
mal interface is urgently needed. Increased 
surveillance is particularly important in high-
risk areas. Examples include the Zoonotic 
Disease Unit in Kenya, which is developing 
capabilities for rapid detection, response, and 
control of zoonotic diseases using a One 
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Health approach, and increased risk-based in-
fectious disease surveillance and monitoring 
along the borders of Kruger National Park in 
South Africa to check for tick-borne disease 
transfer between wildlife and domestic cattle 
populations. Other examples include moni-
toring of animals and humans in deforested 
areas globally, especially in areas close to 
new forest boundaries and disease surveil-
lance along logging roads and in areas known 
to consume bush meat. Resources are limited, 
so it is important to approach increased sur-
veillance using a risk-based approach, focus-
ing in areas with high-risk behaviors. Focus-
ing surveillance in this manner increases the 
likelihood of detecting an infectious disease 
outbreak before it becomes a pandemic. Bio-
surveillance research in these hot spots must 
also be increased to better understand virus 
evolution and the events that trigger spillover 
from animals to humans. 
 
3. Institutionalize education and clini-
cal training for individuals, families, com-
munities, workers, and health care person-
nel living in high-risk areas. Education 
about the diseases in the region, disease 
symptoms, and what should be done if indi-
viduals suspect they have contracted a dis-
ease will help to reduce the time between in-
fection, reporting, and treatment. Education 
about how to prevent infection could reduce 
the risk to individuals living in high-risk ar-
eas or living high-risk lifestyles. 
 
4. Institutionalize One Health and ap-
ply One Health approaches to pandemic 
prevention. This was a recommendation 
made by the Blue Ribbon Study Panel for Bi-
odefense. One Health is intended to promote 
multidisciplinary collaboration between re-
searchers and other nongovernmental offi-
cials. The concept of integrating the 
knowledge and study of animal, plant, and 
human health is vital for protecting the 
United States from naturally occurring and 
man-made diseases. This integration should 
become more formalized across the federal 
interagency and implemented by NGOs, par-
ticularly in global high-risk regions where 
epidemics and pandemics are more likely to 
emerge.  
Problem Topic 5: Implementing a 
Uniform Health Screening System 
for the United States 
Problem Statement: 
Current health screening procedures are 
not sufficient to minimize the risk of infec-
tious disease entry into the United States.  
Background: 
Immigrants and refugees are an important 
part of American society. They enrich our 
melting pot culture and often bring with them 
expertise in areas that contribute to the eco-
nomic well-being of the United States. Re-
garding refugees specifically, the United 
States has an obligation to provide sanctuary 
to peoples fleeing violence and persecution. 
There are, however, inconsistencies in the 
health screening system for individuals seek-
ing residence in the United States. Health 
   26 
 
THE GROWING THREAT OF PANDEMICS: ENHANCING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL BIOSECURITY 
 
screening must be made uniform to protect 
both the American population and the popu-
lations of immigrants and refugees entering 
the country. 
In the United States, the CDC oversees the 
health screening requirements for people en-
tering the country. Every refugee or immi-
grant applying for permanent admission into 
the United States must undergo a medical ex-
amination. If the screening occurs outside the 
United States, it must be performed by a 
panel physician. A panel physician is an 
overseas medical professional who has an 
agreement with the local US embassy or con-
sulate general to perform immigration medi-
cal exams (CDC, 2015). These physicians 
work closely with the US Department of 
State to make sure that comprehensive medi-
cal examinations are given. Any immigrant 
or refugee found to be a drug user or to have 
a “communicable disease of public health 
significance” or a mental health disorder that 
could pose a danger will not be allowed to en-
ter the country (CDC, 2017). Communicable 
diseases affected by this order include pan-
demic flu, SARS or Middle East respiratory 
syndrome (MERS), viral hemorrhagic fevers, 
cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, 
plague, smallpox, yellow fever, or any com-
municable disease that is a public health 
emergency of international concern (CDC, 
2017). 
Once they have arrived in the United States, 
most immigrants are not required to undergo 
any further medical examination. The pur-
pose of the overseas and in-country medical 
examinations is to identify health conditions 
that would prohibit entry into the United 
States. Additionally, these screenings pro-
vide refugee populations the opportunity to 
receive vaccinations for vaccine-preventable 
diseases and to receive treatment for parasitic 
diseases.  
The components of the medical examination 
include a physical and mental examination, 
syphilis serology testing, review of vaccina-
tion records, and chest radiology. The pur-
pose of the chest radiology is to determine if 
there is a chance the person has tuberculosis. 
If the chest x-ray shows potential for tubercu-
losis, additional testing is done. If immigrants 
or refugees are found to have tuberculosis, 
they are required to be treated before they en-
ter the country. Treatment before entry is also 
required for sexually transmitted diseases and 
Hansen’s disease (CDC, 2015).  
Tuberculosis is the number one concern for 
individuals entering the country. The current 
rate of tuberculosis in the United States is 3 
cases per 100,000 persons. Worldwide, how-
ever, tuberculosis is one of the top ten causes 
of death, with one-third of the world’s popu-
lation being infected. According to the World 
Health Organization, 1.8 million people died 
of tuberculosis in 2015 and ~500,000 people 
developed multidrug resistant tuberculosis 
(WHO, 2016). Because of the high preva-
lence of tuberculosis outside of the United 
States, screening incoming immigrants and 
refugees for the disease is a high priority. 
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Vaccinations also play an important role in an 
immigrant’s ability to get a visa for perma-
nent resident status inside the United States. 
While there is some flexibility regarding 
what vaccinations the person must receive, 
the CDC puts forth three main requirements 
for immigrant vaccination: 1) the vaccines 
must be age appropriate, 2) the vaccines must 
protect against a potential infectious disease 
outbreak; and 3) an individual must receive 
vaccines that protect against diseases that 
have been eliminated or are in the process of 
being eliminated from the United States. The 
vaccines required of immigrants coming to 
the US include mumps, measles, and rubella; 
polio; tetanus and diphtheria; pertussis; Hae-
mophilus influenza type B; hepatitis A; hepa-
titis B; rotavirus; meningococcal disease; 
varicella; pneumococcal disease; and sea-
sonal influenza (CDC, 2012). However, these 
vaccination requirements only apply to immi-
grants; routine vaccinations are not required 
for refugees before they enter the United 
States (CDC, 2016b). Instead, refugees must 
show proof of vaccination at the time they ap-
ply for permanent resident status (CDC, 
2017), and children must be properly vac-
cinated before they can be integrated into the 
United States’ school system (CDC, 2016b).  
The difference in vaccination requirements 
for immigrants and refugees is a significant 
gap in the health screening system. Because 
refugees are fleeing violence and persecu-
tion, it can be difficult for them to receive all 
vaccinations before they enter the United 
States; however, they should be required to 
receive all routine vaccinations upon entry 
rather than when they get settled. Changing 
this requirement not only will help to prevent 
disease outbreaks in the United States but 
will protect the refugees themselves from be-
coming ill or dying from vaccine-preventable 
diseases. The Scowcroft Institute recom-
mends that the entrance requirements for vac-
cination be made uniform.  
Another major shortcoming of the health 
screening system is the lack of screening for 
travelers or those with temporary stay visas. 
Medical screenings are only required for in-
dividuals applying for permanent status in the 
United States. The lack of screening for indi-
viduals coming for extended stays in the 
United States but not seeking permanent res-
idence status is a gap in border health screen-
ing that potentially opens the United States 
up to a greater threat of infectious disease.   
The duty of screening immigrants falls to the 
CDC and, more specifically, the Department 
of Quarantine and Migration. The congres-
sional funding request for this department for 
FY2017 is $47 million, which is $15 million 
“ Th e  d i f f e r en ce  i n  v a c c in a t io n  r equ i r e me n t s  f o r  i mmi -
g ra n t s  and  r e fu g ee s  i s  a  s i gn i f i c an t  g ap  in  t h e  h e a l t h  
s c r e e n i ng  s ys t e m.”    
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above last year’s request (CDC, 2016). Con-
tinued increases in funding for Quarantine 
and Migration are important to fill the exist-
ing gaps in the health screening system. Im-
migrants looking for permanent status in the 
United States are responsible for the cost of 
their health screenings overseas; those seek-
ing visas for stays longer than three months 
should be required to do the same. Medical 
care for refugees, however, often falls on var-
ious levels of United States government. 
With approximately 80,000 refugees entering 
the United States every year, resources to en-
able uniform health screening and immuniza-
tions will be needed, and existing health pro-
vision programs should be leveraged to cover 
increased cost to minimize the burden to local 
communities for this national health security 
gap.  
Recommendations and Action Items: 
1. Implement required infectious dis-
ease screenings for immigrants and refu-
gees based on diseases that are endemic in 
their country of origin or the country they 
have been residing in prior to entry into the 
United States. While some infectious disease 
screenings, such as tuberculosis, are already 
required, these screenings should be ex-
panded. Immigrants or refugees found to 
have an infectious disease should have to 
wait for entry until they have reached a non-
infectious state. For refugees, this may mean 
holding them in a facility on US soil until 
they are no longer contagious. HIV should 
also be re-included in the required testing, but 
a positive result should not mean exclusion 
from entering the United States. Instead, the 
test result should be used to notify individuals 
and provide them a link to public health re-
sources. 
 
2. Implement limited infectious disease 
screening for travelers staying in the United 
States more than three months. Much like 
the infectious disease screenings for immi-
grants and refugees, these individuals should 
be tested for infectious diseases that are en-
demic in their country of origin or the country 
they are residing in prior to visiting the 
United States. They should also be tested for 
the “communicable diseases of significance” 
listed previously.  
 
3. Require vaccinations for refugees 
upon arrival rather than when they apply 
for permanent status. This requirement will 
both help protect the American population 
against diseases and protect the refugees 
coming into the country from vaccine-pre-
ventable diseases.  
 
4. The administration and Congress 
should fully support resource requirements 
for the CDC Department of Quarantine and 
Migration and ensure that risk-based, time-
appropriate measures for refugee equalized 
medical screening and immunizations are 
resourced. The administration should con-
duct a cost-benefit analysis and identify ex-
isting health provision programs to cover 
costs to limit the burden to local communities 
for this health security need.  
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Problem Topic 6: Building and Sus-
taining Public Health Infrastructure 
Problem Statement: 
Many developing countries do not have the 
basic public health or medical infrastruc-
ture to prevent, detect, and rapidly respond 
to infectious disease events, let alone large 
outbreaks that require surge capacity. Even 
the American health care system does not 
have adequate surge capacity infrastructure 
to deal with large-scale outbreaks of infec-
tious disease. 
Background: 
One important element of effective infectious 
disease response is the ability of hospitals and 
public health entities—including diagnostic 
laboratories—to respond rapidly and effi-
ciently. During a major disease outbreak, 
hospitals see a surge in the number of pa-
tients. Some of these patients may have been 
sick for a long time before coming in to the 
hospital, and some patients may only think 
that they have contracted the disease—
though, this “walking well” phenomenon is 
likely more prevalent in the United States 
than in the developing world. The large in-
flux of patients created by an infectious dis-
ease outbreak puts more strain on hospitals, 
which may not even be able to meet basic 
needs under normal health conditions. 
Many hospitals, clinics, and laboratories in 
developing countries lack the equipment, 
training, and staff necessary to detect and re-
spond to an infectious disease. In a study con-
ducted by Beracochea, Dickerson, Freeman, 
and Thomason (1995), researchers found that 
only 24 percent of health care workers in a 
health center in Papua New Guinea were able 
to correctly identify the treatment for malaria. 
Likewise, a 1998 study conducted in Pakistan 
found that only 35 percent of health care pro-
viders met the acceptable standard of treat-
ment for viral diarrhea (Thaver, Harpham, 
McPake, & Garner, 1998). Even with the 
2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa, we saw 
that the lack of equipment as simple as gloves 
helped perpetuate the infection. Many devel-
oping countries stricken by the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic have the capacity to test for the dis-
ease but are not able to access any treatment. 
This problem is particularly prevalent in re-
mote areas (Moten, Schafer, and Montgom-
ery, 2012). As of 2014, only 64 of 196 mem-
ber states report compliance with the revised 
WHO International Health Regulations that 
went into force in 2007, and this is likely an 
overstatement as member states’ compliance 
has not been independently assessed (Katz R 
and Dowell SF). Whether the problem is lack 
of personnel, lack of training, lack of supplies 
and equipment, lack of funding, or all of the 
above, many hospitals and clinics in develop-
ing countries are not even able to meet the 
basic health care needs of their community. 
In the case of an infectious disease outbreak, 
they would be virtually helpless to stop it. 
For countries in the developing world af-
fected by conflict, the infrastructure chal-
lenge becomes even greater. For example, a 
2004-2005 outbreak of Marburg hemorrhagic 
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fever in Angola was spread in part by health 
care centers reusing needles and syringes be-
cause the fighting had left them with a persis-
tent lack of supplies (Gayer, Legros, For-
menty, and Connolly, 2007). Conflict also 
exacerbates the problems with adequate and 
trained health care personnel because many 
choose to flee the country due to the violence. 
Although the health care struggles of devel-
oping countries may seem like worlds away, 
they pose a domestic threat to the health of 
Americans and should be an area on which 
the United States government focuses aid re-
sources. Due to the ease and relative afforda-
bility of air travel, along with extensive 
global trade, there are people and goods mov-
ing throughout the world in a matter of hours. 
As we have seen with Ebola and Zika viruses, 
the infectious disease threats of developing 
countries no longer stay in developing coun-
tries. The public health infrastructure prob-
lems of Africa or Southeast Asia are now 
global problems , and not investing in the 
public health infrastructure of these countries 
could lead to serious disease challenges here 
at home. 
Domestically, Smith (2010) found that most 
emergency departments and inpatient facili-
ties at hospitals in the United States are oper-
ating at or near 100 percent of capacity on a 
daily basis. All over the country, hospitals are 
diverting over half a million ambulances a 
year because their emergency rooms are al-
ready overcrowded (Institute of Medicine Fo-
rum on Medical and Public Health Prepared-
ness for Catastrophic Events, 2010). These 
studies show that the majority of hospitals 
around the United States are already maxed 
out on an average night. What if they had to 
deal with hundreds of additional people 
flooding their emergency rooms? 
Many hospitals throughout the United States 
have infection control professionals, 24-hour 
infection control support, and non-health care 
facility surge beds—but almost 20 percent of 
hospitals lack any sort of surge capacity plan 
(Rebmann et al., 2007). Additionally, less 
than half the hospitals across the country 
have a plan for rapid set-up of negative pres-
sure rooms and few to no hospitals can han-
dle a surge that is greater than one hundred 
patients (Rebmann et al., 2007). The situation 
becomes even more dire if the pandemic were 
to be a disease that causes respiratory failure. 
The majority of hospitals in the United States 
cannot handle more than ten additional pa-
tients that need ventilators (Rebmann et al., 
2010). This means that if there were to be a 
large-scale outbreak of a disease like SARS 
or influenza, hospitals throughout the country 
would not be able to care for the number of 
people in need. 
“The  p rob lem of  insuf f ic ien t  in f ras t ruc tu re  i s  a  g loba l  
p rob lem wi th  impl i ca t ions  fo r  our  homeland  secur i ty . ”  
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The problem of insufficient infrastructure is 
a global problem with implications for our 
homeland security. If localized outbreaks be-
come regional epidemics and/or global pan-
demics because laboratories, clinics, and hos-
pitals in developing nations do not have the 
ability to rapidly detect and control out-
breaks, then the devastation caused by high-
impact infectious diseases will enter the 
United States, where we would face our own 
surge capacity struggles. Contributing exper-
tise, personnel, and resources to help build 
and strengthen public health infrastructure 
and train health care workers in developing 
countries is vital to controlling and respond-
ing to the next major outbreak so it does not 
become a pandemic. This requires more than 
just training people and constructing and 
equipping structures. It requires establishing 
institutions in host countries that have their 
own indigenous capabilities and requires that 
newly trained and educated professionals re-
main or return to their host countries. 
Recommendations and Action Items: 
1. Invest in public health infrastruc-
ture and public health capacities in develop-
ing countries. In developing countries, many 
of the health care systems are government 
funded, and the funding is based on tax reve-
nue. There is financial involvement from pri-
vate entities to help bolster the health care 
system as well as foreign investment from the 
World Bank, WHO, donor nations, and other 
philanthropic organizations, though the focus 
is generally on controlling specific diseases 
rather than improving overall systemic infra-
structure. This is a result of funding specific 
diseases through vertical programs versus es-
tablishing horizontal capabilities for an all-
hazards approach. Through the Global Health 
Bureau, USAID also has enhanced efforts to 
control infectious disease through the Emerg-
ing Pandemic Threats program. This program 
began in 2009 and operates within the One 
Health approach. The Emerging Pandemic 
Threats program is doing important work in 
pandemic preparedness by building One 
Health capacities in “hot spot” countries and 
by increasing our ability to understand and 
prevent zoonotic spillover events, but the 
continuing deficiency of public and animal 
health infrastructure in developing countries 
demonstrates that this program, and other 
global health security programs like it, needs 
to receive increased funding and support in 
order to be successful. Both CDC and 
USAID have shown their commitment and 
demonstrated performance regarding public 
health infrastructure and institutional build-
ing.  As the new administration and Congress 
look to refocus federal priorities on defense 
and security, the Scowcroft Institute strongly 
recommends that continued and even en-
hanced global health foreign aid to fight high-
impact infectious diseases is a national secu-
rity priority. The United States should con-
tinue to dedicate funding and resources to 
building and strengthening infrastructure in 
high-risk underdeveloped countries as a pan-
demic prevention, mitigation, and response 
measure in a way that is tailored to establish 
indigenous host country capabilities toward 
achieving global health security.  In addition, 
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the United States cannot afford to lose mo-
mentum in the fight against HIV/AIDs, tuber-
culosis, and malaria and should continue fi-
nancial and programmatic support. 
 
2. USAID should partner with national 
governments in developing countries to help 
them reform their health care hiring sys-
tems. The United States already provides 
large sums of money to train health care per-
sonnel around the world, but there are areas 
still struggling with health care providers 
who are unable to diagnosis routine and en-
demic diseases. Rather than putting increased 
focus on training, some attention and funding 
should be given to make sure that the health 
care professionals being hired are competent 
and qualified and that they will remain in 
their local institutions and host countries.   
 
3. The United States should continue 
high-priority support and leadership for the 
Global Health Security Agenda. This in-
cludes diplomatic engagement to ensure in-
vestments are made by other donor countries 
and philanthropic organizations to build 
needed global public health capacities, along 
with multilateral monitoring of progress to 
achieve compliance with the WHO Interna-
tional Health Regulations required of all 
member states. Importantly, the Global 
Health Security Agenda should move beyond 
a cookie-cutter approach to health institution 
building to a more decentralized, less stand-
ardized approach to better account for local 
culture and local institutions.   
 
 
Problem Topic 7: Decreasing Re-
sponse Time 
Problem Statement:  
The response time for disease identification, 
reporting, diagnosis, and response must be 
reduced. 
Background: 
Since the 2001 anthrax attack, 2003 SARS 
pandemic, 2005 H5N1 outbreak, and the 
H1N1 pandemic in 2009, the United States 
has increased its focus on pandemic prepar-
edness. From 2006 to 2009, the United States 
allocated $5.62 billion through an emergency 
supplemental appropriation to strengthen do-
mestic and global preparedness for an H5N1 
influenza of pandemic potential (Schuchat, 
Bell, & Redd, 2011). The majority of the 
funding was focused on developing antivi-
rals, vaccine R&D and surge manufacturing, 
and strengthening public health infrastructure 
(Schuchat et al., 2011). While all of these el-
ements are important for pandemic prepared-
ness, the importance of developing and field-
ing better diagnostic tests and strengthening 
biosurveillance has been undervalued.   
With regard to diagnostics, there is signifi-
cant need for more funding or a shift of avail-
able funding to diagnostic research and de-
velopment. As discussed earlier, many pan-
demics begin in developing countries with 
limited health care and laboratory infrastruc-
ture. Because of this reality, we need to de-
velop diagnostic tests that can work in lim-
ited-resource settings at point of care 
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(Caliendo et al., 2013). Diagnostics must be 
able to run without electricity and withstand 
temperature extremes and power surges 
(Caliendo et al., 2013), or they will be of lim-
ited use in many developing countries. Diag-
nostics also need to be portable and require 
minimal training so that they can be taken 
into the field and widely used by the public 
health professionals participating in the re-
sponse. It is also important that diagnostic 
platforms are applied and used in day-to-day 
public and animal health applications.    
Rapid and accurate diagnostics, coupled with 
effective reporting systems, will allow medi-
cal and public health professionals to identify 
infectious diseases in less time and take ap-
propriate public health actions, including iso-
lating a potentially infectious patient from the 
rest of the population.  
Coupled with the importance of improving 
rapid diagnostics is expanding and strength-
ening biosurveillance systems. Many devel-
oping countries throughout the world have 
limited or nonexistent surveillance programs. 
For example, prior to the implementation of 
the Early Warning and Response Network in 
Southern Sudan in 1999, it had taken over six 
months to respond to a relapsing fever out-
break the year before (Gayer et al., 2007). For 
many diseases, particularly airborne diseases 
like influenza, having a six month lag in re-
sponse time is unacceptable.  
WHO identifies three types of global surveil-
lance: 1) active, 2) passive, and 3) sentinel.  
Active surveillance is present when desig-
nated surveillance staff regularly visit health 
care facilities, talk with health care profes-
sionals, and look into medical records 
(WHO, 2016c). These staff members are 
looking for suspected cases of disease, and 
when one is found, they document the clini-
cal symptoms and collect epidemiological 
data (WHO, 2016c). The active method of 
surveillance is only used when attempting to 
eliminate or eradicate a disease.  
Passive surveillance is based on the regular 
reporting of disease data from participating 
health care institutions, such as hospitals, la-
boratories, and private practitioners (WHO, 
2016c). Once the data are received, they have 
to be analyzed to determine any potential pat-
terns. Determining patterns can help public 
health officials identify potential disease out-
breaks. This effort is is based on the cooper-
ation of the health care system, so if some en-
tities are not reporting the information, this 
may leave a gap in health knowledge. The 
other challenge with passive surveillance is 
that many countries simply do not have the 
resources to identify and report all cases of 
disease (WHO, 2016c). Identifying disease 
requires good diagnostics, trained laboratory 
technicians, and equipped laboratory net-
works—capabilities that are often lacking in 
developing countries. Therefore, although 
this is the least expensive type of surveil-
lance, it is also the least effective.  
The final type of surveillance is sentinel sur-
veillance. This is used when there is a need to 
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learn more in-depth information about a spe-
cific disease and it is not possible to gain this 
information through the passive surveillance 
system (WHO, 2016c). Sentinel surveillance 
gathers focused data from a limited number 
of sources rather than attempting to gather 
data from sources across the nation or the 
world. This type of surveillance can be effec-
tive in identifying outbreaks or disease 
trends, but it is more likely to miss rare dis-
eases or any diseases that occur outside of its 
small area of surveillance (WHO, 2016c). 
Additionally, WHO has the Global Oubreak 
Alert and Response Network, which ensures 
that there is technical expertise on the ground 
during an infectious disease outbreak. Dr. 
David Heymann wrote a Scowcroft paper de-
tailing the importance of this program for ef-
fective disease response.  
Within the United States, there is also the Na-
tional Notifiable Disease Surveillance Sys-
tem (NNDSS). This system facilitates the 
sharing of information among local, state, 
territorial, federal, and international public 
health entities (CDC, 2015). It is specifically 
focused on helping these organizations share 
disease-related information and utilizes a 
number of different mediums. The goal of 
NNDSS is to help keep all public health or-
ganizations informed of disease-related 
events that could impact their communities.  
The final type of surveillance worth mention-
ing is the Program for Monitoring Emerging 
Diseases (ProMED). This is an internet-
based network run through the International 
Society for Infectious Diseases. It has the 
goal of rapid dissemination of disease-related 
information and has been designed to serve 
as an early warning system. It proved its 
value in the 2003 SARS outbreak. Many Ca-
nadian public health officials first learned 
about SARS (at that time a still unnamed dis-
ease) from the ProMED system. The system 
currently has a presence in approximately 
185 countries and gathers information from 
media reports, official reports, local observa-
tions, and other sources (ProMED Mail, 
2016). This information is then distributed di-
rectly to subscribers, of which ProMED has 
over 70,000, and it is posted on the ProMED 
website (ProMED, 2016). ProMED has 
proven to be an effective system of rapid dis-
semination of disease information.     
Recommendations and Action Items: 
1. Congress should make funding for 
biosurveillance and diagnostics a high-pri-
ority budget item. The United States govern-
ment expends large resources trying to rap-
idly develop a vaccine that, in reality, may be 
only useful for the last outbreak. For exam-
ple, there is still no Ebola vaccine ready to 
rapidly deploy, even though there are prom-
ising vaccine candidates that were rushed 
into clinical trials. Alternatively, point-of-
need rapid diagnostic platforms and ex-
panded laboratory capacities offer the poten-
tial to identify future outbreaks earlier and 
guide more aggressive public health re-
sponses that are known to be effective when 
activated early. Diagnostics and laboratory 
capacity are vital to rapid identification and 
pandemic control and are often overlooked as 
   35 
 
THE GROWING THREAT OF PANDEMICS: ENHANCING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL BIOSECURITY 
 
a priority. In 2016, the CDC received a 
budget of $580 million for emerging and zo-
onotic infectious diseases, though it is not 
possible to tell how much of that went to di-
agnostics and biosurveillance. For 2017, the 
CDC is requesting $629 million for emerging 
and zoonotic diseases—an increase of ap-
proximately $50 million. Other federal de-
partments and agencies have research and de-
velopment programs for diagnostics. The 
NIH also supports diagnostics and biosurveil-
lance research and development, as does 
DOD, USDA, and USAID. The Trump ad-
ministration and Congress should work to-
gether on a new national strategy that priori-
tizes and brings unity of effort to diagnostic 
development and promotion of global labor-
atory capacity building in high-risk regions. 
Congress should authorize and appropriate 
the resources to the department/agencies 
identified in the strategy to address the gaps 
in human and animal diagnostics as well as 
global laboratory network capacity building 
and strengthening. Funding priorities typi-
cally go to vaccine and antiviral develop-
ment, but new vaccines and drugs are very 
expensive; high risk; and take years, if not 
decades, to develop. Vaccines and drugs are 
two elements of disease response but are im-
portant only if available at the start of an out-
break or if they can be surged very rapidly. In 
terms of beginning disease response as 
quickly as possible, we need rapid diagnostic 
systems and global laboratory network ca-
pacity coupled with effective reporting sys-
tems. If necessary, funds should be shifted 
from vaccine development to diagnostics and 
biosurveillance to close this gap.  
2.  The United States should draw on 
the resources at USAID/OFDA consistently 
for international pandemic emergencies. 
Much of the funding for infectious disease 
outbreaks or bioterror incident response is 
largely ad hoc and dependent on emergency 
supplemental appropriations in the United 
States. Typically, when an outbreak occurs, 
there is not existing funding for response op-
erations—or at least not substantial existing 
funding. Supplemental funding must be re-
quested and appropriated in order to fund the 
emergency response. This means that fund-
ing is often not available in sufficient 
amounts until the outbreak is well underway 
or out of control. Domestically, the United 
States Disaster Relief Fund afforded to 
FEMA allows funding to be available right 
away for natural disaster emergency declara-
tions. In a 2016 report, the President’s Coun-
cil of Advisors on Science and Technology 
(PCAST) suggested the establishment of a 
Public Health Emergency Response Fund 
with a funding floor of $2 billion. Although 
the Scowcroft Institute supports this PCAST 
recommendation in concept, particularly for 
domestic response, it is first important that 
the administration and Congress affirm the 
role of USAID/OFDA as the lead for coordi-
nating international pandemic response. 
USAID/OFDA already has effective budget-
ary authorities for disasters that should ex-
tend to international pandemic response. Any 
new international emergency response au-
thority/appropriation request from the Presi-
dent should be integrated with 
USAID/OFDA’s existing authorities and not 
duplicated.  
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Because disasters and emergencies are im-
possible to predict, the OFDA Director has 
flexibility to mount an appropriate interna-
tional disaster response. Giving international 
pandemic response authority to OFDA is the 
ideal solution to the reactive nature of pan-
demic funding. Rather than authorizing two 
separate agencies that are independent and 
potentially duplicating appropriations, Con-
gress should consider authorizing and allo-
cating emergency funds to OFDA and allow 
it to serve as the United States government 
emergency response funding authority to co-
ordinate international pandemic response for 
the United States, in addition to its ongoing 
disaster response authorities and lead role re-
sponsibilities.    
 
Additionally, OFDA currently has what is 
known as borrowing authority, which allows 
the USAID administrator to transfer up to 
$50 million from any USAID account into 
OFDA’s International Disaster Assistance 
Account. While this is important and allows 
OFDA to rapidly respond to disasters, $50 
million is not sufficient. We propose that the 
amount be raised to $200 million.   
Finally, a new national strategy and appropri-
ate resources for pandemic prevention and 
preparedness activities during the inter-epi-
demic period must be established.  
Problem Topic 8: Establishing Cul-
tural Competency  
Problem Statement: 
Current global disease response is top-
down, applying a Westernized model that is 
not effective in developing countries. The 
United States must integrate cultural com-
petency into disease preparedness and re-
sponse. 
Background: 
The importance of cultural competency has 
never been demonstrated more starkly than it 
was in the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Guinea, Si-
erra Leone, and Liberia. Teams from WHO 
and across the world entered the countries 
with a scientifically sound plan for contain-
ing the disease. Unfortunately, they were not 
prepared for the cultural and religious obsta-
cles they would encounter. This was particu-
larly true regarding the traditional burial 
practices of people throughout the infected 
regions. At one point in the outbreak, WHO 
estimated that nearly 60 percent of all Ebola 
cases in Guinea could be linked to traditional 
burial practices (Manguvo & Mafuvadze, 
2015).  
“ Unfo r tuna te ly ,  t hey  were  n o t  p repa red  fo r  the  cu l tu ra l  
and  re l ig ious  obs tac les  they  wou ld  encoun te r . ”  
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The religious tradition of the three most af-
fected countries during the 2014 Ebola out-
break are Christian, Islam, and a number of 
local religious cultures. One thing all these 
religious cultures have in common is that 
their burial practice requires washing and/or 
touching the dead body in order to prepare it 
for burial. One local culture, the Kissi, be-
lieves that when a pregnant woman dies, she 
cannot be buried with her fetus, and if she is, 
it will have dire consequences for the living 
(Maxman, 2015). Thus, they must cut the fe-
tus out of the woman’s body before burial, 
which makes Ebola transmission all but inev-
itable. In the early months of the outbreak, 
there was suspicion of the outsiders that came 
to help control the disease. There was out-
right objection to sanitary burials. Response 
teams struggled with the local people, trying 
to force the scientifically sound practices and 
procedures on them. Finally, towards the 
later stage of the outbreak, one team brought 
in a cultural anthropologist from Cameroon 
(Maxman, 2015). This anthropologist helped 
find religiously appropriate ways to make 
reparations for not holding proper burials so 
that public health officials could bury the 
dead in a sanitary manner.  
Compounding the problem of cultural differ-
ences was that 70 to 80 percent of the popu-
lation in Western Africa relies on traditional 
medicine, which is to say they use traditional 
healers rather than modern, Westernized 
medical treatments and procedures 
(Manguvo & Mafuvadze, 2015). Many of the 
traditional healing practices require the 
healer to touch the sick body, leading to many 
healers becoming infected with Ebola and 
spreading it to other individuals in the popu-
lation. Early on in the outbreak, traditional 
healers also served as sources of false infor-
mation about the disease, particularly in re-
mote, rural populations (Manguvo & Ma-
fuvadze, 2015). During these early days, 
many traditional healers claimed that they 
could heal individuals from Ebola and dis-
suaded the use of modern medicine. Later on 
in the outbreak, however, traditional healers 
began to acknowledge their lack of under-
standing of the disease and express their de-
sire to obtain adequate training (Manguvo & 
Mafuvadze, 2015). 
The Ebola outbreak of 2014 demonstrated 
that scientific understanding is necessary, but 
not sufficient, for controlling an outbreak of 
infectious disease. Without cultural sensitiv-
ity and understanding, it can be nearly impos-
sible to deal effectively with disease. Future 
disaster preparedness and response teams 
need to identify staff members, consultants, 
and local leaders that can help in disease re-
sponse. 
Recommendations and Action Items: 
1. Cultural anthropologists should be 
consulted and included in international 
public health missions undertaken by the 
United States. Cultural anthropologists 
should be drawn from the university system 
and should consult with the top levels of the 
public health response effort. Understanding 
the culture and rituals of a country will 
greatly decrease the amount of time it takes 
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to get an infectious disease outbreak under 
control. As mentioned previously, under-
standing the cultural burial practices in West 
Africa during the 2014 Ebola outbreak may 
have resulted in much less loss of life.  
 
2. Crisis communication specialists 
should be included in United States pan-
demic response. Trained crisis communica-
tors should be drawn from the public sector, 
the private sector, or academia and appointed 
to facilitate communication in a country af-
fected by infectious disease. They should 
work closely with cultural anthropologists to 
clarify and support communication chal-
lenges facing the affected population and re-
sponders. Their ultimate role should be to 
help responders achieve their containment 
goals and help the affected population better 
understand the pandemic they are facing.   
Problem Topic 9: Expanding the 
Role of Universities  
Problem Statement: 
Universities have the knowledge base and 
infrastructure to educate local populations 
about the risk of infectious disease.  
Background: 
Universities are places of higher learning. 
Their primary role is to conduct ground-
breaking research and educate future genera-
tions. While this is an extremely important 
role of a university, it does not have to be the 
only role. During outbreaks and crises, gov-
ernments and nongovernmental organiza-
tions descend upon the affected region. Re-
sponders are typically new to a region and do 
not stay long after the outbreak has been con-
tained. While these governments and NGOs 
do play a vital role in controlling the situa-
tion, they are outsiders and they are tempo-
rary. Universities, on the other hand, exist in 
the region day in and day out. They have es-
tablished connections with the local commu-
nities and have well-educated, trusted indi-
viduals who can educate towns, villages, and 
cities before a disease outbreak occurs. There 
is also a growing network of global academic 
collaborations between the developing and 
developed world, where academicians can ef-
fectively build long-standing collaborative 
relationships despite political disagreements 
among nations.  
In the United States, land-grant institutions 
have the responsibility of establishing exten-
sion programs. The extension programs al-
low research objectives to remain closely re-
lated to state needs. The university can listen 
to the populations’ concerns, address their 
problems, and do research in areas the com-
munity needs the most help. Extension pro-
grams also hold classes and seminars to help 
community members learn new skills and im-
prove their lives. In developing countries, 
universities should serve this same role. They 
could educate the population about the threat 
of infectious disease, teach them how to pro-
tect  themselves, help with the response when  
there is an outbreak, and lead the rebuilding 
and learning after an outbreak.
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themselves, help with the response when 
there is an outbreak, and lead the rebuilding 
and learning after an outbreak. Educating the 
Educating the local communities before there 
is an infectious disease outbreak and working 
with the community to rebuild following an 
outbreak are the two most important roles 
universities in developing countries can play. 
Recommendations and Action Items: 
1. Build a public health extension pro-
gram to work within local communities. 
Universities are a great source of community 
education in the developing world. Like land-
grant American universities, universities in 
developing countries should develop educa-
tion and extension programs with a focus on 
issues important to the community, including 
public health and infectious disease. Inform-
ing communities of the threat and how to re-
duce it will help prevent outbreaks of infec-
tious disease in the developing world. Uni-
versities in developing countries may also be 
able to pair up with individuals from WHO, 
FAO, OIE, HHS, DOD and USAID, who are 
already working in areas of public health. 
 
2. Educate the entire university com-
munity about the threat of infectious dis-
ease. Education about infectious disease does 
not have to be done through formal classes. 
Seminars or regular programs should be es-
tablished aimed at increasing awareness 
among the university student population. Ed-
ucating students about infectious disease at 
this level will allow them to enter the adult 
population with infectious disease 
knowledge and will help them educate family 
and friends in their cities, towns, or villages.   
 
3. Universities need to become re-
sponders along with government agencies 
and NGOs. In developing countries, much of 
the public health and infectious disease ex-
pertise and laboratory capability is already 
concentrated in institutes of higher learning. 
Because many of them already have the facil-
ities, knowledge base, and local connections, 
they would be very effective partners of mil-
itaries, governments, or NGOs in infectious 
disease response. Working relationships be-
tween universities and other pandemic re-
sponse organizations should be established 
prior to an outbreak so that there is less con-
fusion when outbreak occurs. 
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Strengthening domestic and international 
preparedness and response to infectious dis-
ease is not a small task. In this report, we have 
discussed nine broad issue areas and the ac-
tion items that accompany them. The United 
States government and international system’s 
current reactive process for responding to in-
fectious disease and the frequency with 
which infectious diseases with pandemic po-
tential are occurring demonstrate the undeni-
able need to reform the international and do-
mestic pandemic response system. Develop-
ing centralized leadership; coordinating ex-
isting agencies and departments; reforming 
WHO; and providing adequate funding to es-
tablish sufficient supplies, infrastructure, ex-
pertise ,and institutions are paramount to suc-
cess in pandemic response. If the US ignores 
the challenges surrounding infectious dis-
ease, we will continue to move towards a 
greater and greater pandemic crisis. Foreign 
aid for global health and related investments 
has never been more important to interna-
tional security and US national security.  The 
US and the rest of the international system 
must recognize the enormity of the challenge 
and take steps to aggressively meet that chal-
lenge. 
Conclusion 
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